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H I G H L I G H T S
• First article on the probability of spills
associated with a UK shale gas industry
• Spills occur on the well pads and during
ﬂuid transportation to and from the site.
• A spill during transportation is predict-
ed for every 19 well pads developed.
• A spill onsite is predicted for every 16
well pads developed.
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The predicted number of incidents and spills that are likely to occur during the transportation of fracking related
ﬂuids from the development of a UK shale gas industry.
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Rapid growth of hydraulic fracturing for shale gaswithin the USA and the possibility of shale developmentswith-
in Europe has created public concern about the risks of spills and leaks associatedwith the industry. Reports from
the Texas Railroad Commission (1999 to 2015) and the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission (2009 to 2015) were
used to examine spill rates from oil and gas well pads. Pollution incident records for England and road transport
incident data for the UK were examined as an analogue for potential offsite spills associated with transport for a
developing shale industry.
The Texas and Colorado spill data shows that the spill rate on thewell pads has increased over the recorded time
period. The most common spill cause was equipment failure. Within Colorado 33% of the spills recorded were
found duringwell pad remediation and random site inspections. Based on data from the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion, a UK shale industry developing well pads with 10 lateral wells would likely experience a spill for every 16
well pads developed. The samewell pad development scenario is estimated to require at least 2856 tankermove-
ments over two years perwell pad. Considering this tankermovement estimatewith incident and spill frequency
data fromUKmilk tankers, a UK shale industrywould likely experience an incident on the road for every 12well
pads developed and a road spill for every 19 well pads developed. Consequently, should a UK shale industry be
developed it is important that appropriate mitigation strategies are in place to minimise the risk of spills associ-
ated with well pad activities and ﬂuid transportation movements.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Increased global demand for energy is driving a rapid increase in
the use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling (Gross et al.,
2013; Patterson et al., 2017). Hydraulic fracturing allows for en-
hanced oil and gas extraction from unconventional formations such
as low-permeability shale and source rock (McLaughlin et al., 2016).
The process involves high-volume ﬂuid injection of fracturing ﬂuid
into a shale reservoir at a sufﬁcient rate to raise downhole pressure
above the fracture pressure of the formation rock, when the shale is
pressurised ﬁssures and interconnected fractures are formed enabling
greater ﬂow rates of gas into the well (Gregory et al., 2011; Wilson et
al., 2017). Once the hydraulic fracturing processes are performed the
pressure is relieved and the fracturing ﬂuid returns to the surface
through the borehole, the returning ﬂuid is termed ﬂowback ﬂuid
(Gregory et al., 2011).
Within the USA, fracturing ﬂuids are typically composed of about
90% water, 9% proppant (e.g. sand), and 0.5–1% chemical additives
(McLaughlin et al., 2016; Vidic et al., 2013). Additives are generally de-
livered to the well site in a concentrated form and stored until they are
mixedwith the base ﬂuid and proppant and pumped down the produc-
tion well (USA EPA, 2016). Within the USA additives are often stored in
multiple, closed containers and moved around the site in specially de-
signed hoses and tubing (USA EPA, 2016).
Flowback ﬂuid is typically highly saline, reaching ﬁve times the
salinity of sea water (Gregory et al., 2011). It can also contain high
levels of dissolved and suspended solids, heavy metals, fracking
chemicals, naturally occurring radioactive materials of varying
concentrations and hydrocarbons extracted from the formation
(Edminston et al., 2011). The volume of ﬂowback that returns to
the surface is variable, with between 10 and 50% of the fracturing
ﬂuid returning to the surface (Akob et al., 2015) during the ‘ﬂowback
period’ (the ﬁrst two weeks after hydraulically fracturing the rock)
(Howarth et al., 2011). During the active gas production stage,
aqueous and non-aqueous liquid continue to be produced in consid-
erably lower volumes than the fracking and ﬂowback ﬂuids over the
lifetime of the well (known as producedwater - Gregory et al., 2011).
Typically within the USA, ﬂowback water and produced water ﬂow
from the well to onsite tanks or pits through a series of pipes or
ﬂowlines before being transported offsite via trucks or pipelines for
disposal or reuse (USA EPA, 2016). Therefore, for the development
and exploitation of shale gas resources there would be three types of
potentially polluting liquids to consider: the frackingﬂuid; theﬂowback
water; and the produced water. In addition undiluted chemical
additives also need to be considered.
In the USA it is common for themajority of these potentially hazard-
ous ﬂuids (fracking ﬂuid, ﬂowback and production waters - Drollette et
al., 2015; DiGiulio et al., 2011) to be transported considerable distances
by truck on public roads to and from the drilling sites, this can lead to
incidents and spillages on the road (Eshleman and Elmore, 2013). In
addition to the risks associated with transport, as with other outdoor
practises, well pad sites (the area required for the borehole, drilling
equipment, piping and storage) are exposed to extreme weather and
environmental conditions (e.g. heavy rainstorms, severe windstorms,
ﬂoods and freezing conditions) which can also lead to spills and leaks
of potentially hazardous ﬂuids on the well site (Eshleman and Elmore,
2013). Even with appropriately designed storage equipment for addi-
tives, blended hydraulic fracturing ﬂuids, ﬂowback ﬂuids and produced
water, spills could occur.
Currently there is no shale gas production within Europe, however
exploration wells are underway and the public have expressed many
concerns regarding the potential for water contamination. Included in
the perceived risk to water is the potential for polluting spills and
leaks to contaminate land, surface water and groundwater, which if se-
vere may lead to polluted ﬂuid being exposed to humans and natural
ecosystems (Eshleman and Elmore, 2013; Vengosh et al., 2014). Based
on our review there have been no studies published in the peer-
reviewed scientiﬁc literature addressing the potential for spills and
leaks, either onsite or offsite, from possible hydraulic fracturing sites
within Europe.
Within the USA a number of studies have considered the risk to the
surface and subsurface environment from spills and leaks. Gross et al.
(2013) examined theColoradoOil andGas Commission's database of in-
cidents and found surface spills were associatedwith b0.5% of the active
wells. Drollette et al. (2015) found that groundwater near theMarcellus
shale gas operations in north eastern Pennsylvania had been contami-
nated by diesel-range organic compounds via accidental release of
fracturing ﬂuid chemicals, derived from the hydraulic fracturing
activities at the surface. DiGiulio et al. (2011) found leakages from stor-
age and disposal pits were responsible for the high concentrations of
benzene, xylenes, gasoline range organics, diesel range organics and
total purgeable hydrocarbons found in shallow ground water around
the Pavillion ﬁeld in Wyoming. The USA Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) assessed data from nine state agencies, nine oil and gas
production well operators, nine hydraulic fracturing service companies
and determined 457 hydraulic fracturing-related spills occurred be-
tween January 2006 and April 2012 (USA EPA, 2015). More recently
Patterson et al. (2017) considered spills from unconventional oil and
gas wells, in Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota and Pennsylvania
from 2005 to 2014, recording that between 2 and 16% of wells reported
a spill each year.
These reviews of spills and leaks have only considered onsite inci-
dents, not those occurring offsite. The average multi-stage well in the
USA requires hundreds to more than a thousand round trips to trans-
port equipment, chemicals, sand and water required for well develop-
ment and hydraulic fracturing (Adgate et al., 2014; Muehlenbachs and
Krupnick, 2013). Muehlenbachs and Krupnick (2013) found a signiﬁ-
cant increase in the total number of accidents and accidents involving
heavy trucks in counties with a relatively large degree of shale gas de-
velopment, compared to those counties with less (or no) development:
they found one additionalwell drilled permonth raised the frequency of
an accident by approximately 2% and increased the risk of a fatality by
0.6%. The Texas Department of Transportation also noted that the inﬂux
of trafﬁc from the development of the Permian Basin had generated an
increase in the number of road trafﬁc accidents: a 27% increase in road-
way fatalities, trucks were involved in 7% of these reported crashes
(Texas Department of Transportation, 2013). These studies did not con-
sider the potential for spills and leaks from these offsite incidents.
With the possibility of a shale gas industry emerging within the UK
Goodman et al. (2016) determined the number of truck visits required
over the lifetime of a single-well pad with six-wells, and from this, the
impact upon local air quality, greenhouse gas emissions and noise emis-
sions. However the number of incidents and spillages were not consid-
ered. Lacey and Cole (2003) used information from UK databases on
vehicular ﬂow of tankers, accident rate and the probability that an acci-
dent would result in a spill; from this they predicted the expected num-
ber of spills per year. Their analysis predict the likelihoodof a spill which
exceeds 150 kg of chemical load spilling on a 2 km section of road is
once in 370 years, with a range of 75 to 1800 years.
Thus, the aim of this study was to assess the probability of surface
spills and leaks of undiluted additives, fracturing ﬂuid, ﬂowback water
and produced water, assessing the probability of spills occurring both
onsite (on the well pad) and offsite (during ﬂuid transportation). Sec-
ondlywe have assessed volumes spilt and the underlying cause of spills
in analogue developments to help generatemitigation strategies for po-
tential future sites in the UK.
2. Approach and methodology
A leak is a way for ﬂuid to escape a container or ﬂuid-containing sys-
tem. The word leak usually refers to a gradual loss; whilst a sudden loss
is usually called a spill. For simplicity this study refers to any accidental
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and undesired escape of ﬂuid as a spill. Additionally we have not distin-
guished between the different types of ﬂuids spilt (e.g. ﬂowback water,
fracking ﬂuid, produced waters), we are aware that the toxicity of the
type of ﬂuid spilt and therefore the impact of the spill can vary consid-
erably, for example spilling a highly saline ﬂowbackwater is very differ-
ent to spilling produced waters contaminated with BTEX or crude oil.
However, within this studywe have focused on the probability of an in-
cident occurring rather than the consequence.
Without a shale gas industry currently operating within Europe in-
formation has been drawn from both onsite and offsite experiences in
the USA and analogues from within the UK. Due to differences in the
source and occurrence of the spills this study has analysed onsite and
offsite incidents separately. Two USA state data sources were
considered: the Texas Railroad Commission (Texas RRC – RRC, 2017a)
and the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission (COGCC - COGCC, 2017a,
2017b). The recorded spills have been evaluated to assess the type,
volume and reasons for the currently occurring spills. From this
spill analysis the probability of spills onsite for potential shale gas
developments within Europe has been assessed. In England, spills
from oil and gas sites are reported to the Environment Agency (EA)
and recorded in the pollution incident database. This was analysed to
access the number of incidents that have occurred on conventional
well pads within England.
Without a fully developed shale industry within the UK, fracking
ﬂuid, produced water and ﬂowback ﬂuid will be transport to and from
the site via tanker trucks. It is currently believed the new development
at the Preston New Road site in Lancashire will require produced and
ﬂowback ﬂuid to be transported over 80 km by truck to the Davyhulme
wastewater treatment works in Manchester. With increased transpor-
tation from Preston New Road to Davyhulme there is an increased
chance of an incident or spill offsite. With a lack of information in
Europe and the USA for incidents offsite, UK milk and fuel (petrol and
diesel) tanker incidents were analysed as an analogue to determine
the probability of an incident related to hydraulic fracturing occurring
on the road for different shale gas development scenarios. These vehicle
types have been identiﬁed within the records and were considered a
good analogue for the transport required within a UK shale industry,
as they often operate on rural roads carrying liquid that is a pollutant
with respect to surface waters. Recorded tanker incidents have been
cross-correlated with the pollution incident database for England to de-
termine their environmental impact.
2.1. Onsite
2.1.1. Texas Railroad Commission (Texas RRC) database
The Texas RRC enforces the delineation and reporting of any spill of
0.8 m3 or more within the state of Texas (RRC, 2017b). The dataset in-
cludes surface spills of crude oil, gas well liquid1, products2 and
combined3 (RRC, 2017a). This data is publically available and docu-
ments the number of spills, volume spilt, spill type, facility type the
losswas from and the cause for all spills from 2009 to 2016. The data in-
dicates the gross loss per spill, the amount of spill recovered and the net
loss. The data were evaluated for each year individually and then com-
piled to assess trends within the whole dataset. The statistical signiﬁ-
cance of trends was assessed using a t-test and in all cases signiﬁcance
was judged at a probability of not being zero of 95%. The Texas RRC
also records the number of wells active per year and the volumes of
crude oil produced; from these the percentage of produced crude oil
spilt was calculated. From the average number of spills per year and
the average number of active wells per year, the average number of
spills per well has also been calculated.
2.1.2. Colorado Oil and Gas Commission (COGCC) database
The COGCC require operators to fully report: (1) spills of any size
that impact or threaten to impact waters of the state (streams, lakes,
ponds, drainage ditches), structures, livestock, public byways; (2) spills
N0.2 m3 that released exploration and production (E&P), or produced
water outside of the berm or other secondary containment; (3) spill of
0.8 m3 or more, regardless of whether the spill was contained within
the berms or other secondary containments (COGCC, 2015). The
COGCC has two spill databases, due to considerable changes in process-
ing and data collection these databases are not comparable and have
been analysed separately, these two datasets are henceforward referred
to as: “1999–2015 spill data”; and “2014–2015 spill data” (COGCC,
2017a, 2017b). Both datasets included data for 2016; however, data
were only available for the ﬁrst two quarters of 2016, as the dataset for
2016 was incomplete it was not included in this study. The “2014–
2015 spill dataset” provides the following information on each spill;
timing, location, type and volume, facility type (where breach occurred)
and the impact on land and surrounding environment. Conversely the
“1999–2015 spill dataset” is less comprehensive, only consisting of the
number of activewells, the annual volume of oil andwater spilt and pro-
duced and the percentage of the produced oil and water spilt. From the
“1999–2015 spill data” we have assessed the changes and patterns in
oil and water spill numbers and volumes over the 17 years recorded.
Using the number of active wells per year and the “1999–2015 spill
data” the average number of spills per well has been calculated.
2.1.3. Pollution incident database
The Environment Agency records the pollution incidents in England
and classiﬁes them according to their impact on the population, the
environment and level of response required (EA, 2017). Each incident
is recorded by date and location and is categorised on pollution type
and impact. The pollution impact category system is 1 (major) to 4
(no impact). The pollution incident database for England contains
12,335 incidents recorded between March 2001 and December 2016
(EA, 2017).
To determine the number and cause of incidents related to well in-
tegrity failure within England, Davies et al. (2014) analysed the pollu-
tion incident database. Davies et al. (2014) only reported incidents
which could be conﬁrmed as being due towell integrity failure, whereas
as this study considered all incidents reported, from anywell pad. Iden-
tiﬁcation and analysis of the cause of releases in currently operating in-
dustries allows for lessons to be learnt and mitigation strategies to be
put in place avoiding repeating these incidents.
2.1.4. Onsite industrial development scenarios
TheUK's Institute of Directors (IoD) have suggested several shale gas
development scenarios for the UK, the ﬁrst is based on the development
of a 10-well pad of 10 laterals (onewell padwith 10wells eachwith one
lateral) (Taylor et al., 2013). The second involved the development of a
10-well pad of 40 laterals (onewell padwith 10well eachwith four lat-
erals) (Taylor et al., 2013). These two scenarios have been used along
with the calculated number of spills per well (based on data from the
Texas RRC, the COGCC and the pollution incident database) to deter-
mine the likely number of spills that would occur on a single site, and
howmany sites would be developed before wewould likely experience
a spill. As it is unlikely only one site would be developed these results
highlight the accumulative risk of a number of well sites.
2.2. Offsite
2.2.1. Milk tankers
Without a shale gas industry currently operatingwithin Europe, this
study has used an analogue of UK milk tanker journeys to predict the
1 Condensate or other hydrocarbons produced from a gas well.
2 Derived from petroleumhydrocarbons, for example, crude oil, processed crude petro-
leum, residue from crude petroleum, fuel oil, natural gas gasoline, gas oil, waste oil, blend-
ed gasoline, lubricating oil, blends or mixtures of petroleum, and/or any and all liquid
products or by-products derived from crude petroleum oil or gas, whether hereinabove
enumerated or not.
3 Combination of crude, condensate, and/or other produced water.
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probability of spills during the transportation of frackingﬂuid, produced
water and ﬂowback water to and from the well site. Within this study
milk tankers are deﬁned as vessels used to transport large quantities
(approximately 30 m3) of milk. This study does not include references
to milk ﬂoats, vans or lorries. Assuming an average milk tanker size of
30 m3, some 366,667 milk tanker journeys are required to transport
the 11 million m3 of milk produced by British farmers each year
(Taylor et al., 2013). A search for local media reports involving milk
tanker incidents in the UK between 1998 and 2016 was carried out.
The data collection involved searching for all online media articles that
mentioned “milk”, “tanker”, “accident”, “incident”, “road”, “crashes”,
“overturned”, “UK” and “spillage”. There was no discrimination on the
type of report or article, authorship or publisher used. Incidents due to
engine ﬁres were not recorded. The number of milk tanker incidents
that were reported was recorded; those that resulted in a spillage of
milk or ﬂammable liquid (e.g. diesel) were logged; as were the volumes
spilt if documented and cause of incident. If the incident resulted in in-
juries or fatalities these were noted.
Where possible incidents reported in the media were matched to
those recorded in the pollution incident database, and the type and
scale of the pollution caused by the spill incidents assessed. As this
database only includes incidents from England, only these have been
matched.
2.2.2. Fuel tankers
The UK road fuel (petrol and diesel) tanker ﬂeet is estimated to be
around 1000–1500 vehicles, these are estimated to travel some
220,000 km each year (Robinson et al., 2014). The size and volume ca-
pacity of fuel tanker trucks varies considerably. Commonly large tanker
trucks with capacities of 21–44 m3 are used to transport petrol and
diesel to ﬁlling stations (Madigan, 2017). Fuel tankers have been
studied, as similarly to milk tankers they are a good analogue for the
truck movements that would be associated with a UK shale industry.
Unlike milk tankers the average number of journeys required each
year to transport the nations fuel is undocumented in the literature.
Therefore, the number of fuel tanker journeys has been determined
from the known volume of motor fuel consumed by the UK, recorded
by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS,
2017) and the average tanker size used. This estimate was then used
to determine the probability of an incident or spill per year.
The Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) compiled data on all tank-
er accidents by carrying out a search of local BBC news reports involving
tanker incidents which occurred in the UK between 2009 and 2014
(Robinson et al., 2014). Their data collection involved searching for all
media articles that mentioned “tanker” and “accident” on the BBC
news website. These were then assessed on whether a spill occurred;
aﬂammable liquidwas spilt; an injury resulted; the incidentwas caused
by a collision or the tanker overturned; and if the tanker overturning led
to a spillage (Robinson et al., 2014). This study continued the search for
2015 and 2016 in the samemanner to themethod used by TRL. In a sim-
ilar manner to milk tankers a broader search was then conducted just
for fuel tankers between 2009 and 2016, using the same search terms
to check for milk tanker accidents, with the addition of “milk” being
substituted for “fuel”, “petrol” and “diesel”. As with milk tankers,
where possible, spill incidents related to fuel tankers were matched to
incidents recorded in the pollution incident database.
2.2.3. Offsite industrial development scenarios
The development scenarios proposed by Taylor et al. (2013), along
with the annual number of incidents and spills per milk and fuel tanker
on the road for 2016 have been used to calculate the potential number
of incidents and spills related to a future UK shale industry. Data for
2016 was used to generate the following scenarios as this was deemed
the most accurate, being the most up to date.
Taylor et al. (2013) ﬁrst scenario, based on the development of a sin-
gle 10-well pad of 10 laterals, would potentially produce 0.9 km3 of gas,
requiring 136,000 m3 of water per well. Initially it is likely that the
water will be trucked to the site rather than piped, thus requiring be-
tween 2856 and 7890 tankers over a 20 year period (Taylor et al.,
2013). If tanker movement was concentrated in the early years of dril-
ling activity, which is most likely, this would average out at 3.9–10.8
tanker movements per day over two years, or if spread over 20 years
decreasing to 0.4–1.1 per day (Taylor et al., 2013). The second
scenario, based on a single 10-well pad of 40 laterals, potentially pro-
ducing 3.6 km3 of gas and using 544,000 m3 of water per pad equates
to between 11,155 and 31,288 tanker movements over 20 years, or
1.5–4.2 tankermovements per day (Taylor et al., 2013): when averaged
out over ﬁve years this equals 6.1–17.1 truck movements per day
(Taylor et al., 2013). As it is unlikely that just onewell pad would be de-
veloped the probability of an incident or spill occurring from a number
of well pads was estimated.
3. Results
The analysis of the results has been split into incidents that occurred
onsite and incidents that occur offsite, during transportation.
3.1. Onsite
3.1.1. Texas Railroad Commission
The number of reported spills between 2009 and 2015 has increased
each year with 675 reported in 2009 and 1485 in 2015 (Table 1). Over
the same period the number of producing wells has also increased
from 157,807 in 2009 to 193,807 in 2015. The number of spills per pro-
ducing well increased at an average rate of 0.0006 spills/yr2, the t-test
showed that the increase in spill rate is signiﬁcant at 95% probability.
Of the 7820 spills recorded during the study period the majority
(83%) involved the loss of crude oil (Table 1). The most common
cause of leakage was due to equipment failure; the second was due to
corrosion (rust) of equipment, followed by ‘Acts of God’ and human
error. The most common location for a spill to occur was around the
tank battery (70% of the spills), followed by the ﬂow line (10%) and
pipe line (8%).
The number of crude oil spills has increased year on year since 2009,
with 549 crude oil spills reported in 2009 and 1270 in 2015. The average
number of crude oil spills per year was 924. The number of crude oil
spills per producing well increased at a rate of 0.0001 spills/yr2 - signif-
icant at the 95% probability (Table 1). The total annual volume of crude
oil spilt varied from 6713 m3 (2009) to 14,158 m3 (2015) (Table 1). The
average rate of change over this seven year period was 805 m3/yr2
which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% probability. Clean-up opera-
tions recover some of the lost ﬂuid, however much is left unrecovered.
Annually between 50 and 76% of the crude oil spilt is recovered, with
an annual average of 59% (Table 1). The largest spill was recorded in
2010 with 3975 m3 of crude oil escaping in one incident; however,
99.7% of this was recovered (Table 1). The largest reported net loss of
crude oil for a single spill was 1069m3 (Table 1).
Between 2009 and 2015, 715 producing wells reported gas well liq-
uid spills. The number of spills involving gas well liquid decreased over
the time period analysed, this trend was not statistically signiﬁcant
(Table 1). The total annual volume of gas well liquid spilt ranged from
489 m3 in 2015 to 2438 m3 in 2013 (Table 1). The annual average per-
centage of gas well liquid recovered was 30% of the amount spilt.
The number of spills involving product varied year on year, from ﬁve
spills in 2015 to 95 in 2013 (Table 1). Although there has been an
increase in the number of wells and spills per year the trend was not
statistically signiﬁcant. The annual percentage recovery rates show
that 65% of the product is recovered after a spill (Table 1). The annual
average minimum and maximum recovery ranged from 16% in 2012
to 94% in 2010 (Table 1).
For the loss of combined liquids there has been a statistically signif-
icant trendover the period of record: in 2009 three caseswere recorded,
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whilst in 2015 154 cases were recorded (Table 1). The annual average
minimum and maximum recovery ranges from 20% in 2011 to 91% in
2010 (Table 1).
3.1.2. Colorado Oil and Gas Commission
The 1999–2015 spill data does not distinguish between whether it
was oil or water being spilt. It records a total of 6617 spills, the maxi-
mum and minimum numbers of spills per year were 789 in 2014 and
193 in 2002 (Table 2). The average number of spills per year was 389.
Between 1999 and 2015 there has been an increase in the number of ac-
tive producingwells and the number of spills at a rate of 0.00017 spills/
yr2, however, this increase is not statistically signiﬁcant. A total of 0.11
km3 of oil and 0.88 km3 of water were produced between 1999 and
2015. Of this 8670m3 of oil and 81,200m3 of water were spilt, equiva-
lent to 0.008% and 0.009% of the oil and water produced (Table 2). For
this dataset there is no information on recovery rate or reasons for the
spills.
Of the 2009–2015 spill data, only years 2014 and 2015 are complete,
therefore only those years have been studied. Of the 2893 spills record-
ed during this period; 563were oil, 401 condensate, 50 ﬂowbackwater,
1399 producedwater, 78 E&Pwaste and 129 drillingﬂuid (Table 3). The
volume spilt varies considerably; 188 spills were recorded between N0
and b0.2 m3, 1201 were between ≥0.2 m3 and b0.8 m3, 1051 were be-
tween ≥0.8m3 and b16m3 and 180were ≥16m3 (Table 3). The average
length and width of a spill was 33 m and 10 m, whilst the maximum
was 1416 m and 152 m. The average depth to groundwater in the
spill locality was 28 m and the average depth the spill impacted
was 2.5 m, with a maximum depth impact of 22 m. Just over 73%
(2112) of spills had ≥0.16 m3 of ﬂuid leak outside the berm of the
well pad, with three sites requiring an emergency pit to be construct-
ed. The average volume of soil that needed to be excavated due to
pollution from a spill was 220 m3, with a maximum of 10,780 m3
being removed from one site. Polluted soil was excavated offsite
from 471 sites; 62 sites treated the soil onsite, whilst 74 sites had
the soil disposed of by alternative methods. The average volume of
groundwater removed was 42 m3, with 484 m3 being the maximum
quantity removed from one site. At two sites 1 m3 and 6 m3 of sur-
face water was removed. Of the spills documented; 1107 impacted
soil, 260 groundwater, 16 surface water and 30 dry drainage
features.
Of the spills 1946were termed ‘recent’, thus recent or ongoing at the
time of discovery. Whereas 947 were termed ‘historical’, therefore the
spill occurred at a time unknown or was discovered during activities
such as plugging and abandonment or site reclamation. Of the spills
653 were reportedly due to equipment failure, 254 human errors, 186
were historical and 46 were recorded as “other”. Examples of “other”
include weather, vandalism and external sources of interference such
as cattle. In 2014, one instance involved cattle rubbing against the
valve handle of the wellhead partially opening the valve allowing
produced water to spill out. In 2015, there was a report of wild horses
pushing open a 2.5 cm valve, this was determined by tracks and faeces
left in the area. The most common location facility type from which
spills originated from was the tank battery, with 36% of spills initiating
there, whereas 6% of the spills were associated with pipelines.
3.1.3. Pollution incident database
Based on data provided byDECC, Davies et al. (2014) comments that
there were 143 onshore oil and gas wells producing at the start of the
year 2000. Between 2000 and 2013 the Environment Agency recorded
nine pollution incidents involving the release of crude oil within 1 km
of an oil and gas well. Two of the spills were recorded at the Singleton
Oil Field and were caused by borehole cement failure. The other seven
pollution incidents were due to leaks from pipework linked to the
well (Davies et al., 2014). Between2000 and 2013 the pollution incident
rate was 0.0045 incidents/well/yr.Ta
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3.2. Application
Using data from the Texas RRC and values from the ﬁrst scenario
(based upon well pads with 10 laterals) the probability of a spill occur-
ring on a developed site in the UKwas calculated at 0.06 spills/well pad;
therefore there would likely be a spill onsite for every 16 well pads de-
veloped (Fig. 1).When the COGCC 1999–2015 spill data and values from
the ﬁrst scenario are used the likelihood of a spill is 0.11 spills/well pad;
therefore a spill would likely occur for every 10 well pads developed
(Fig. 1).
Using data from the Texas RRC and values from the second scenario
(based uponwell pads with 10-wells, eachwith four laterals) the likeli-
hood of a spill onsite was 0.26 spills/well pad; therefore it is likely that a
spill would occur for every four well pads developed (Fig. 1). Using the
COGCC 1999–2015 spill data and values from the second scenario the
likelihood of a spill is 0.44 spills/single-well pad, therefore there
would likely be a spill for every three well pads developed (Fig. 1).
Using data from the Environment Agency's pollution incident data-
base the results for the ﬁrst scenario showed that the likelihood of a
spill onsite was 0.045 incidents/single-well pad; therefore a spill
would likely occur for every 23 well pads developed. Using data from
the pollution incident database and values from the second scenario
the likelihood of a spill onsite was 0.18 incidents/well pad; therefore
there would likely be a spill for every six well pads developed.
3.3. Offsite
3.3.1. Milk tankers
Between 1998 and 2016 122 milk tanker incidents were recorded,
54 of these were reported to have spills associated with them. The last
four years studied saw the highest number of annual incidents, between
1998 and 2016 the number of incidents per year increased at a rate of
0.6 incidents/yr2. The rate of change over this 19 year period was statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 95% probability. The greatest number of milk
spills recorded in a year was six, in 2016. The number of spills per
year has increased at a rate of 0.5 spills/yr2 - statistically signiﬁcant at
the 95% probability. Of the spills 89% consisted of milk and 24% ﬂamma-
ble liquid, and where mentioned it was diesel, implying that the acci-
dent had been severe enough to rupture a fuel tank. The largest spill
involved 20 m3 of milk escaping from the tanker. However many
media reports have not recorded the quantity of milk spilt, nor were
the volumes of ﬂammable liquid spilt commented on. Of the incidents
assessed 61% were caused by a collision, this was most commonly
milk tankers with other cars, but also with central reservations, hedges,
houses and in one incident a bridge. Tankers rolled over in 43% of the re-
ported cases, often due to a collision but also due to tankers jack kniﬁng,
tankers breaking away from the drivers cab and drivers losing control.
One of the spills was caused by a faulty valve. Injuries were reported
in 58% of incidents, 16% of these resulted in death.
Table 2
The annual number of activewells, number of spills and volumes of oil andwater produced and spilt for Colorado. Data recorded by the ColoradoOil and Gas Commission (COGCC, 2017a).
Year Number
of
active
wells
Number
of spills
Oil
spilled
(m3)
Water
spilled
(m3)
Oil
produced
(m3)
%
Produced
oil
spilled
Water
produced
(m3)
%
Produced
water
spilled
Average oil
spilled (m3)
per incident
Average
water spilled
(m3) per
incident
Average oil
produced
(m3) per
incident
Average water
produced
(m3) per
incident
% Of
active
wells
that
spilled
1999 21,745 263 363 6576 3,131,683 0.01 36,590,207 0.02 1 25 11,908 139,126 1.21
2000 22,228 254 569 3584 3,183,339 0.02 40,227,601 0.01 2 14 12,533 158,376 1.14
2001 22,879 206 308 1682 3,208,682 0.01 42,335,137 0.00 1 8 15,576 205,510 0.90
2002 23,711 193 509 9196 3,270,789 0.02 45,013,104 0.02 3 48 16,947 233,229 0.81
2003 25,042 213 465 3105 3,434,841 0.01 48,137,113 0.01 2 15 16,126 225,996 0.85
2004 26,968 222 637 5898 3,588,455 0.02 46,985,899 0.01 3 27 16,164 211,648 0.82
2005 28,952 326 797 3917 3,692,872 0.02 55,177,628 0.01 2 12 11,328 169,257 1.13
2006 31,096 336 414 5317 3,894,915 0.01 63,313,559 0.01 1 16 11,592 188,433 1.08
2007 33,815 376 648 4308 4,163,614 0.02 62,628,307 0.01 2 11 11,073 166,565 1.11
2008 39,944 408 508 11,441 4,759,933 0.01 58,431,321 0.02 1 28 11,667 143,214 1.02
2009 37,311 368 443 3532 4,827,681 0.01 57,129,268 0.01 1 10 13,119 155,243 0.99
2010 41,010 499 521 5349 5,243,162 0.01 57,559,586 0.01 1 11 10,507 115,350 1.22
2011 43,354 501 522 5374 6,271,776 0.01 54,762,143 0.01 1 11 12,519 109,306 1.16
2012 46,835 407 716 2334 7,869,668 0.01 52,857,376 0.00 2 6 19,336 129,871 0.87
2013 50,067 633 627 2281 10,397,330 0.01 52,203,721 0.00 1 4 16,425 82,470 1.26
2014 51,737 789 388 2847 15,230,669 0.00 53,356,073 0.01 0 4 19,304 67,625 1.53
2015 53,054 623 233 4468 20,038,113 0.00 52,190,327 0.01 0 7 32,164 83,773 1.17
Total 599,748 6617 8670 81,208 106,207,523 0.01 878,898,369 0.01 1.10
Average 389 510 4777 6,247,501 51,699,904
Maximum 789 797 11,441 20,038,113 63,313,559
Minimum 193 233 1682 3,131,683 36,590,207
Table 3
The type of ﬂuid and volume of ﬂuid spilt for 2014 and 2015 in the State of Colorado. Data from Colorado Oil and Gas Commission (COGCC, 2017b).
Volume spilt
(m3)
Number of oil
spills
Number of
condensate spills
Number of ﬂowback
water spills
Number of produced
water spills
Number of E&P
waste spills
Number of drilling
ﬂuid spills
Total number
of spills
0 2083 2125 2801 912 2778 2094
N0 and b0.2 98 41 0 43 1 5 188
≥0.2 and b0.8 265 259 15 607 24 31 1201
≥0.8 and b15.9 191 90 30 606 46 88 1051
≥15.9 9 11 5 143 7 5 180
unknown 247 367 42 582 37 670 1945
Total number
of spills
563 401 50 1399 78 129
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Six milk tanker incidents reported in media reports correlated with
an incident in the pollution incident database, i.e. 48 milk spills were
not found to be recorded in the pollution incident database. Air pollu-
tion was recorded in two of the incidences; the impacts of these events
were reported as being minor and “signiﬁcant” (note that the term sig-
niﬁcant is as used within the database and implies no statistical signiﬁ-
cance as is the case in the rest of this study). Two incidents were
reported as causing land pollution; one was considered as having
minor impact and the other ‘signiﬁcant’. All the incidents were recorded
as polluting a water system; two were determined minor and four as
“signiﬁcant”. Pollutant type has been determined for each incident,
three spills were categorised as oils and fuel, the other three were re-
corded as; organic chemicals or product, general biodegradablematerial
andwastes, and speciﬁcwastematerials, i.e. each of these could be a de-
scription of a milk tanker incident.
3.3.2. Fuel tankers
From the review of the local BBC media reports TRL identiﬁed 59 in-
cidents involving a variety of vehicles (both rigid and articulated) and
loads (foodstuff, chemicals and fuels) between 2009 and 2014
(Robinson et al., 2014). Of those recorded 42%were found to be spillage
incidents, with 80% of those cases involving ﬂammable liquids
(Robinson et al., 2014). A tanker overturned in 37% of themedia report-
ed incidents (Robinson et al., 2014). Of these 64%were then reported to
have spilled their load. When this study continued the search for 2015
no additional media stories were recorded, however, when the media
search was conducted using the broader approach, as used for identify-
ingmilk tanker incidents, the reported fuel tanker incident numbers for
2015 and 2016 were 14 and 17 respectively. Of these 36% and 53% re-
sulted in a fuel spillage. The largest known spill volume was 8 m3 in
2016, however this could be far higher as many of the media reports
did not record the volume spilt. When assessing the media reports be-
tween 2009 and 2016 with the broader search terms, 61 incidents
were recorded, of these 44% had associated spills. The incident rate in-
creased annually by 1.7 incidents/yr2, whilst the spill rate increased an-
nually by 0.96 spills/yr2, these rates were statistically signiﬁcant at the
95% probability. Of the incidents reported 51% involved an injury,
whereas 23% were associated with a fatality. All incidents were caused
by some sort of collision,with 28% of the incidents resulting in the tank-
er overturning. There was no correlation between the fuel tanker inci-
dents recorded in the media and the pollution incident database.
3.4. Application
3.4.1. Milk tankers
The results for the ﬁrst scenario (based on well pads with 10-wells,
each with one lateral) with the lower tanker movement estimate
(2856 tankers) concentrated over the ﬁrst two years of drilling resulted
in the probable number of incidents and subsequent spills being be-
tween 0.043 and 0.118 incidents/year and 0.027 and –0.075 spills/
year. When spread over 20 years the probable number of incidents
was between 0.004 and 0.012 incidents/year, with the predicted
number of spills being between 0.003 and 0.008 spills/year. The
accumulative risk of an incident or spill over the lifetime of a well
(in this case 20 years as assumed in Taylor et al., 2013) for this sce-
nario was between 0.086 and 0.237 incidents/lifetime of the well
pad and 0.055–0.151 spills/lifetime of the well pad. Based on the
milk tanker data and the lower tanker movement estimate spread
over two years, there would likely be one incident on the road for
every 12 well pads developed and a spill for every 19 well pads de-
veloped (Fig. 2). This is equivalent to one 30 m3 tanker truck spilling
part of its load out of the 54,264 required to transport the 1,628,000
m3 of ﬂuid needed for 19 well sites.
The likely annual number of incidents and spills for the second sce-
nario (based upon well pads with 10-wells per pad, each with four lat-
erals) if the lower tanker estimate (11,155 tankers) movements were
concentrated over ﬁve years would be between 0.067 and –0.118 inci-
dents/year, and 0.043 and –0.119 spills/year. When truck movements
are spread over 20 years the probability of an incident or spill was be-
tween 0.017 and –0.047 incidents/year and 0.011 and –0.03 spills/
year. The accumulative risk of an incident or spill over the lifetime of a
well for this scenariowould be between 0.304 and–0.853 incidents/life-
time of thewell pad and 0.183 and –0.512 spills/lifetime of thewell pad.
Based on themilk tanker data and the lower tankermovement estimate
spread over ﬁve years, there would likely be an incident on the road for
every three well pads developed and a spill for every ﬁve well pads de-
veloped (Fig. 2). This is equivalent to one tanker truck out of the 55,775
required for ﬁve wells sites spilling part load.
3.4.2. Fuel tankers
For 2016 the recorded volume of motor spirit (gasoline/petrol) and
Derv (road diesel) used were 11,951 KT and 24,648 KT (BEIS, 2017):
or 15,800,000 m3 of gasoline, 29,200,000 m3 of diesel and a total of
45,000,000 m3 of hydrocarbon road fuels. A large tanker generally
used for fuel transportation has a capacity of between 21 and 44 m3,
we have averaged this value for our study. Therefore, with an average
fuel tanker capacity of 32.5 m3, 1,384,415 fuel tanker journeys would
be required annually.
The results for the ﬁrst scenario (based on a well pad with 10-wells,
each with one lateral) with tanker movement concentrated over the
ﬁrst two years of drilling resulted in the probable number of incidents
and subsequent spills being between 0.018 and –0.048 incidents/year
and 0.009 and –0.026 spills/year. When tanker movement is spread
over 20 years the probable annual number of incidents and spills was
between 0.002 and –0.005 incidents/year and 0.001 and –0.003 spills/
year. The accumulated risk of an incident or spill over the lifetime of a
well would be between 0.035 and –0.097 incidents/lifetime of the well
pad and 0.019 and –0.051 spills/lifetime of the well pad, therefore
there would likely be an incident on the road for every 29well pads de-
veloped and a spill for every 55 well pads developed (Fig. 3).
The likely annual number of incidents and spills for the second sce-
nario (a single-well padwith 10-wells, each with four laterals) if tanker
movement was concentrated over ﬁve years would be between 0.027
and –0.077 incidents/year, and 0.015 and –0.041 spills/year. When
tanker movement was spread over 20 years the probability of an inci-
dent and spill was between 0.007 and–0.019 incidents/year and
0.004 and –0.010 spills/year. The accumulated risk of an incident
or spill over the lifetime of a well for this scenario would be between
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Fig. 1. The number of sites that need to be developed before a spill is likely to occur onsite,
based ondata from the Texas RRC and COGCC. Scenario 1 (dark blue bars): Single-well pad
with 10-wells, eachwell is a lateral; Scenario 2 (light blue bars): Single-well pad with 10-
wells, eachwell has four laterals. (For interpretation of the references to color in thisﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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0.137 and –0.384 incidents/lifetime of the well pad and 0.073 and –
0.203 spills/lifetime of the well pad. Based on the fuel tanker data and
the lower tankermovement estimate spread overﬁve years, an incident
on the roadwould likely occur for every sevenwell pads developed and
a spill would likely occur for every 13 well pads developed (Fig. 3).
4. Discussion
It is unrealistic to assume that all the spills within Texas and Colora-
do were reported, further back in time incidents may have been left un-
reported due to a lack of regulation, more recently incidents may have
been left unreported due to lack of regulation compliance, or spills
may have occurred undetected, therefore there could be bias in the re-
sults. Despite the limiting factors mentioned these values enable us to
attempt to determine the annual spill rates onsite within these states.
The analysis of the Texas RRC dataset from between 2009 and 2015
and the COGCC dataset from 1999 to 2015 highlight that there has
been an increase in the annual rate of crude oil spills. The increased
spill rate for the Texas RRC was statistically signiﬁcant at 95% probabil-
ity. The increase could be due to tighter and stricter enforcement on
reporting of spills, or due to companies being more honest and
reporting a higher number of spill incidents. Alternatively, companies
are not learning from experience and are getting worse at managing
site equipment (for example there is a mismatch between equipment
lifetime and maintenance) leading to an increase in spill numbers.
The USA EPA (2015) determined 457 hydraulic fracturing-related
spills occurred in 11 different states between January 2006 and April
2012, with spills of ﬂowback water being the most common spill type
reported. Among the spills for which the cause was reported, the most
common was human error (33%) and equipment failure (27%) (USA
EPA, 2015). The most common cause of a spill within both Texas and
Colorado in this study was equipment failure, which like the USA EPA
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report, indicates the need for improvements in maintenance and
equipment checks onsite. Although the Texas RRC results highlight
that clean-up operations recover between 5 and 76% of the crude oil
spill, prevention is vital, releases into the environment pose a consider-
able risk to the surrounding ecosystems.
Within Patterson et al. (2017) 50% of the spills were related to stor-
age and moving ﬂuids via ﬂowlines. The USA EPA study records the
most common source of a spill within the 11 states assessed was from
storage units (USA EPA, 2015). Within this study the results differ
from the literature, with the most common location for a spill within
both states being from the tank battery, with 70% of the spills in Texas
being associated with tanker batteries, compared with 8% of spills
being associated with pipelines.
Patterson et al. (2017) studied the states of Colorado, New Mexico,
North Dakota and Pennsylvania, and found the median spill volume
ranged from 0.5 m3 in Pennsylvania to 4.9 m3 in New Mexico; whilst
the largest spills exceeded 100 m3. Of the 457 hydraulic fracturing-
related spills reported by USA EPA, 88 were of fracturing ﬂuid, with
the median spill volume being 3.1 m3 (USA EPA, 2015). In addition
there were 225 spills involving ﬂowback and produced water, these
had a median spill volume of ~3.4 m3. Of the 2893 spills recorded in
the “2009–2015 spill data” from the COGCC records, the majority
were of low volumes, between ≥0.2 and b0.8 m3. However, spills often
reached considerable sizes (180 reached ≥16 m3) and therefore impact-
ed extensive areas. One reported spill reached a depth of 22m. Inmany
cases spills have led to large quantities of soil and groundwater being
removed. Within the literature there are also reports of spills reaching
groundwater, indicating that these incidences are not as rare as one
would hope (USA EPA, 2015). EPA also reported that 7% of the hydraulic
fracturing-related spills in their study reached a surface water body
(often streams or creeks); the median volume per spill was ~13 m3,
with volumes per spill ranging from ~0.3 m3 (5th percentile) to ~170
m3 (95th percentile) (USA EPA, 2015). Within this study over 70% of
the spills involved leaks outside the berm, with emergency pits often
being required to prevent serious pollution incidents. The issue with re-
gard to spills is therefore twofold. It is apparent that spills occur due to
equipment failure, also the lack of spill management practise allows for
the spill to continue and pollute greater areas. Given so many spills
leak outside the berm highlights that well pad infrastructure is not ﬁt
for purpose, it needs to be reassessed with more appropriate infrastruc-
ture put in place. More stringent onsite spill management practises
would hopefully prevent spills occurring and causing considerable,
avoidable damage.
It is unrealistic to assume that all incidents involving milk and fuel
tankers on UK roads were identiﬁed from the approach used in this
study. Media reports were mainly produced for milk and fuel tanker in-
cidents which were notable for a particular reason. For example: the
tanker shed its load during the incident, particularly if large quantities
were spilled or the loadposed a threat to the public; the accident caused
roads to be closed and caused severe congestion or delays; the accident
had a high severity, including fatalities or injuries. The further back one
searches for events, the fewer are found. Therefore the results from the
media articles are likely to be low estimates of the actual number of
tanker related incidents in a year. Despite the limiting factors men-
tioned these values enable us to attempt to determine the likely annual
number of tanker incidents and spills. Using the milk tanker results as
an analogue and different development scenarios given by the IoD re-
port, our analysis shows that when (2856–7890) tanker movements
for a single 10-well pad with 10 laterals is concentrated over two
years the likely annual number of spills is less than one. However, the
production of the low permeability shale formations decreases rapidly
over the ﬁrst few years of drilling; it is thought by up to 85% during
the ﬁrst three years (Vengosh et al., 2014). Therefore, shale gas wells
are required to be drilled at high rates to overcome the rapid decline
in production. If hydraulic fracturing was to go forward in the UK this
would potentially mean tens to hundreds of well pads with hundreds
to thousands of laterals being drilled over several years. It is worth not-
ing that the number of well sites that could be located within the UK
would be limited by the carrying capacity of the surface, thus the pres-
ence of existing infrastructure and the setbacks each well requires.
Clancy et al. (2018) study found that the average carrying capacity for
a well pad measuring 10,800 m2 (average conventional UK well pad
size), with a setback of 152m and a lateral of 500 mwas 26%. Therefore
26well pads could be located on average per licence block, with a range
of between 5 and 42 (Clancy et al., 2018). Our calculations show that the
number of spills increases to 2–6 when 100well sites with 10-wells per
pad with one lateral each is developed.
The majority of the reported trafﬁc incidents were caused by colli-
sions, most commonly milk tankers with cars. Research suggests that
drivers who drive for business purposes are at an above average risk
of accident involvement relative to the general driving population
(Clarke et al., 2005). Generally heavy goods vehicles such as milk
tankers are 7.5 times more likely to present an accident risk to other
road user per kilometre (Copsey et al., 2010). Different explanations
are put forward in the literature to explain the higher number of
accidents involving commercial road transport, it is important to under-
stand these so appropriate mitigation strategies can be developed.
Several suggested explanations why heavy goods vehicle drivers are at
a higher risk are, they undertake longer journeys, often drive late at
night or during the early hours when fatigue and drowsiness is more
likely to occur (Copsey et al., 2010; RoSPA, 2001). Truck drivers are
often driving under time pressure and are more likely to carry out
distracting tasks whilst driving, such as making phone calls, eating
and drinking (Copsey et al., 2010; Broughton et al., 2003). Milk tankers
are also required to carry heavy loads down small country tracks which
are often unﬁt for purpose and sometimes made worse by bad weather
conditions or heavy trafﬁc. Tominimise the likelihood of an incident oc-
curring there are a number of mitigations strategies that could be put in
place, these include regular vehicle inspections and maintenance of
vehicles, specialised training and instructions for drivers, selecting
appropriate route and planning trips according to weather and road
conditions. It is also important for the employer to avoid tight schedules
for drivers and to make sure a sufﬁcient number of rest stops are
planned.
The study has focused on estimating the number of spills from po-
tential shale gas developments but not the consequences of these spills.
The consequence of surface spills associatedwith hydraulic fracturing is
a complex issue and one that is difﬁcult to measure as there have been
few incidents documented in the peer-reviewed scientiﬁc literature.
Papoulias and Velasco (2013) record a leak of fracking chemical into a
2 km stretch of Acorn Fork Creek in Kentucky (USA) in May and June
2007. The incident led to the streams pHdropping to 5.6, the conductiv-
ity increasing to 35,000 μS/cm, aquatic invertebrates and ﬁsh dying and
those that were not killed being left in distress (Papoulias and Velasco,
2013). Fish examination from the polluted stretch of the river by the
USA Geological Survey showed that of the 45 ﬁsh examined all had se-
vere gill lesions, consistent with exposure to low pH and toxic concen-
trations of heavy metals (Papoulias and Velasco, 2013). Bamberger
and Oswald (2012) documented several experiences farmers have had
with regards to shale gas operations leading to environmental concerns.
One example involved a release of fracturing ﬂuid due to aworker shut-
ting down a chemical blender during the fracturing process (Bamberger
andOswald, 2012). Theﬂuids released ﬂowed into an adjacent cowpas-
turewhichwas then reported to have led to the death of 17 cowswithin
one hour (Bamberger and Oswald, 2012). Another reported example
was caused by a defective value on a hydraulic fracturing ﬂuid tank,
the fault led to hundreds of litres of hydraulic fracturing ﬂuid leaking
onto a goat pasture (Bamberger and Oswald, 2012). The goats exposed
to the ﬂuid were later reported to have issues reproducing over the fol-
lowing two years (Bamberger andOswald, 2012). However, it should be
noted that the studies of Papoulias and Velasco (2013) and Bamberger
and Oswald (2012) had no control to knowwhat might have happened
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had no spill occurred, or if another ﬂuid type had been spilt. Further-
more, it should be noted that these examples are not unique to a shale
gas industry.
In Europe, hydraulic fracturing is still in the exploratory stage; how-
ever, a report in the German Tax De newspaper reported a leak which
occurred in 2007 (Kummetz, 2011). The report claimed that a waste
water pipe leaked at a tight gas ﬁeld in Söhlingen, Germany, causing
groundwater contamination with benzene and mercury (Kummetz,
2011). Similarly, on the 24th July 2002, 19 m3 of milk was spilt into a
stream ﬂowing into Rudyard Lake near Leek in Staffordshire, this
incident correlates with an ‘organic chemicals/products’ spillage in the
pollution incident database. The impact of the incident were classiﬁed
as follows; air pollution category 2 (‘signiﬁcant’); land pollution catego-
ry 4 (no impact);water pollution category 3 (minor). A BBCnews report
commented that 50,000 ﬁsh were in danger if the milk entered the res-
ervoir after a milk tanker crashed into a bridge (BBC news, 2002).
Given the highlighted risks of spills from shale gas operations, miti-
gation methods are a necessity. Procedures need to be in place to iden-
tify, evaluate and mitigate potential risks associated with the
transportation, handling, storage anddisposal of hydraulic fracturing re-
lated ﬂuids. Patterson et al. (2017) comments that enhanced and
standardised regulatory requirements for reporting spills could improve
the accuracy and speed of analyses to identify and prevent spill risks and
mitigate potential environmental damage. Additionally, baseline, site
and monitoring after plugging and abandonment are essential. Initial
baseline monitoring at the site and in the surrounding area allows for
comparisons to be made to the original environment so deviations
from the norm can be recognised. Systematic equipment checks and
regular site monitoring should allow for any equipment failures to be
acknowledged and dealt with rapidly, thus avoiding future spills. Long
termmonitoring after plugging and abandonment allows for equipment
failures to be recognised so any issues that do arise can be dealt with ap-
propriately. It is important that those responsible for the above moni-
toring are conﬁrmed and adequate monetary provisions are made
prior to drilling so all concerned are aware of who is responsible for
the long term maintenance of the wells. Transparent and consistently
measured data sharing allows for insights to be gained into when and
where spills are most likely to occur, and the underlying causes. Better
understanding of these factors would provide regulatory bodies and in-
dustrymakerswith important information onwhere to target efforts for
locating and preventing future spills (Patterson et al., 2017). All equip-
ment should be ﬁt for purpose and investments must be made into
sourcing the most up to date and appropriate technologies. Well sites
and equipment should also be appropriately designed for adverse
weather conditions, including severe ﬂooding. On large-scale develop-
ment projects pipeline construction should be considered instead of
trucking the ﬂuid required for hydraulic fracturing, although it is worth
noting that pipelines can also leak and spillages are often difﬁcult to
identify. Within the UK a common practise carried out by water treat-
mentworks is site contained drainage, the site is linedwith an imperme-
able membrane and any ﬂuid discharged is directed towards carefully
located drains and collected in tanks underground. The ﬂuids collected
can therefore be appropriately dealt with. This practise should be intro-
duced at all sites within Europe to contain any spill that do occur.
5. Conclusion
Results from Colorado and Texas show that spill rate is increasing,
and within Texas this increase is statistically signiﬁcant. Based on data
from Texas RRC, a UK shale industry consisting of well pads with 10 lat-
erals would likely experience a spill for every 16 well pads developed.
When 40 laterals are developed on a single well pad, a spill would likely
occur for every four well pads developed. The datasets these values are
based upon specify the leading cause of a spill is equipment failure,
followed by human error. With 33% of the spills recorded in Colorado
being found during site remediation and random site inspections it is
important that regular site inspections are performed by an appropri-
ately trained work force andwhere possible constant onsite monitoring
is carried out.
Based on the milk tanker data and tanker movement estimates of
2856 tankers over two years, a well pad of 10 laterals would likely
experience an incident for every 12 well pads developed and a spill
for every 19well pads developed. Consequently, should a shale industry
go forward within the UK, or anywhere else in Europe, it is important
that appropriate mitigation strategies are in place to minimise the risk
of spills associated with well pad activities and ﬂuid transportation
movements.
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